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Abstract
Background: The ability to invent means to deceive others, where the deception lies in the perceptually or contextually
detached future, appears to require the coordination of sophisticated cognitive skills toward a single goal. Meanwhile
innovation for a current situation has been observed in a wide range of species. Planning, on the one hand, and the social
cognition required for deception on the other, have been linked to one another, both from a co-evolutionary and
a neuroanatomical perspective. Innovation and deception have also been suggested to be connected in their nature of
relying on novelty.
Methodology/Principal Findings: We report on systematic observations suggesting innovation for future deception by
a captive male chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). As an extension of previously described behaviour – caching projectiles for
later throwing at zoo visitors – the chimpanzee, again in advance, manufactured concealments from hay, as well as used
naturally occurring concealments. All were placed near the visitors’ observation area, allowing the chimpanzee to make
throws before the crowd could back off. We observed what was likely the first instance of this innovation. Further
observations showed that the creation of future-oriented concealments became the significantly preferred strategy. What is
more, the chimpanzee appeared consistently to combine two deceptive strategies: hiding projectiles and inhibiting
dominance display behaviour.
Conclusions/Significance: The findings suggest that chimpanzees can represent the future behaviours of others while
those others are not present, as well as take actions in the current situation towards such potential future behaviours.
Importantly, the behaviour of the chimpanzee produced a future event, rather than merely prepared for an event that had
been reliably re-occurring in the past. These findings might indicate that the chimpanzee recombined episodic memories in
perceptual simulations.
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Introduction
We present systematic observations of a male chimpanzee who
appears to have invented the use of concealments – both
manufactured and naturally occurring ones – to be used for
projectiles for future throwing at zoo visitors. That is, planning
behaviours that produced a possibly desired outcome in the future,
instead of relying on mere preparation for an upcoming situation
that has been experienced before.
It has been suggested that human planning skills evolved in
response to an increasingly complex social environment [1,2].
Undoubtedly, thinking about how one’s current actions will affect
others’ future behaviours often steers one’s choices. Our long-term
social predictions are arguably important in both cooperative and
competitive contexts. Planning for how to deceive prey or
opponents before encountering them is an effective low-cost
strategy.
The ability to solve new problems or to come up with novel
solutions to old problems has often been associated with
innovation. Innovations for deception are prime examples of
social innovations [3].
Foresight
The theoretical roots of cognitive foresight research lie in the
field of memory studies. In 1972, Tulving proposed a distinction
between semantic and episodic memory [4], creating an essential
framework for current animal research on foresight and memory.
An easy way to distinguish them is to regard the first as knowing, the
latter as remembering.
The semantic system represents general knowledge about the
world. By contrast, the episodic system involves perceptual
simulations from a first-person perspective. Knowing that
Budapest is the capital of Hungary comes from the semantic
system, but remembering the sight and smell of the fig tree in the
back yard of the city’s royal palace comes from the episodic
system.
Tulving made a notable addition to his initial theory by making
a type of consciousness – autonoetic (self-knowing) consciousness –
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Tulving was introducing autonoetic consciousness, another
hypothesis was being put forward: the episodic system provides
not only memories of past events but also mental constructs of
possible future ones. This hypothesis has now been confirmed in
several areas, from neurocognition to child development (for
review see e.g. [6,7]). It appears as though episodic memory
contributes previously experiences that are recombined into
a novel construct, representing a possible future event.
To elucidate the distinctively subjective, first-person-perspective
of autonoetic consciousness, Tulving used the phrase mental time
travel: autonoetic consciousness makes it possible to travel in time
cognitively and phenomenally, to revisit or pre-visit events.
Metaphorically, autonoetic consciousness provides the ‘‘inner
eye’’ by which one ‘‘sees’’ past or future, perceptually simulated,
events.
Animal studies face a problem: it is problematic methodolog-
ically to rely on a terminology that presupposes phenomenal
consciousness. This has caused considerable quandaries over how
to parsimoniously interpret the results of certain studies on
planning and memory in corvines and primates [8–15]. Is it ever
possible to know whether an animal uses an episodic system given
that one has no way to probe subjective experiences? Is it therefore
also valid to deny the existence of an episodic system even if
behavioural and neurobiological data suggest one, just because of
the lack of phenomenal insight?
It is in fact not known whether the phenomenal experience that
accompanies human foresight is functional or merely an epiphe-
nomenal byproduct of other processes. It is however roughly
known which brain areas are involved in episodic operations in
humans, and that those operations seem to rely partly on re-
organising stored perceptual inputs (for review see e.g. [7]). In
principle, those operations are empirically testable in non-humans
– indeed, they have partly been studied [16]. One way to avoid
arguments dependent on phenomenological access is to distinguish
sensations from perceptions: sensations describe the subjective
experience of events, perceptions their physical interpretation [17].
An episodic system relying on perceptual simulation does not
logically entail subjective experience. However, it does presuppose
(re-)organization of perceptually detached information. This is
a somewhat different way to avoid the problem of subjective
experience than the one taken by Clayton and colleagues [18]:
instead of returning to the initial definition of episodic memories –
which did not include consciousness or simulation – we propose
a more neurobiologically based, but also non-phenomenal,
approach, where perceptual simulations are central.
An important empirical challenge is to show whether the future-
oriented behaviour in question relies on something more than
mere cognitive repetition of an entire previous experience. That is,
whether the animal under study can prepare for novel situations
that require mentally recombining perceptual elements into new
configurations, as the human episodic system allows. Such a finding
for a non-human species would strongly suggest the existence of an
episodic system. Many investigations and much debate have
concerned the so-called Bischof-Ko ¨hler hypothesis [19–23].
Suddendorf and Corballis [24] first offered the hypothesis, stating
that ‘‘…animals other than humans cannot anticipate future needs
or drive states and are therefore bound to a present that is defined
by their current motivational state’’. It does seem that an episodic
system facilitates such anticipation; however, passing or failing the
Bischof-Ko ¨hler ‘‘test’’ is not necessary, and perhaps not even
sufficient, for establishing or rejecting episodic foresight in non-
human animals: a certain flexibility appears just as important. (For
similar ideas, see [25])
Deception
Numerous reports of deceptive primate behaviours exist
[26,27]. Some exist for corvines as well [28–31]. Byrne and
Whiten [32] introduced the concept of tactical deception, which they
later elaborated on [33]. Tactical deception is a type of
behavioural deception, not a morphological one as for example
mimicking the colour pattern of a venomous snake. Under normal
circumstances, the behaviour in question is presented ‘‘honestly’’;
however, in this case it is used tactically, to mislead. Consider
a raven that appears to make a cache in the presence of onlookers,
even though it does not empty the contents of its beak.
Of course, in many instances tactical deception can occur
without the deceiver having any representation of the false
knowledge states of the deceived. Such representations require that
one have a so-called Theory of Mind [34]: an understanding of that
the other’s psychological state lies behind the behaviour. That skill
is sometimes called mind reading. Theory of mind or mind reading is
not required where the ‘‘reader’’ has associatively learned
Figure 1. The deceptive approach. The series shows the chimpanzee when he slowly moved towards the group of visitors before releasing his
projectiles. Note the two projectiles in his left hand. The picture on the left was taken 31 seconds before the throw; the central picture, where he
picks up an apple from the water moat, was taken 15 seconds before; the right picture was taken 1 second before the throw. (The times are
estimated from a video footage recorded at the same occasion). (Photo: Tomas Persson).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036782.g001
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stances – or even where one can reason what one would have done
in the situation the other is in, without assuming anything about
the other’s state of mind. Such exceptions to mind reading could
include one’s generalized experience of others’ direct line of gaze,
with no conceptual understanding of them as ‘‘seeing’’. An
example would be that when food is and has been outside the
other’s direct line of gaze, the other makes no attempt to take it
[35]. This broader category of behaviour-predicting skills is often
referred to as behaviour reading.
Although no single study has provided unequivocal evidence for
mindreading in non-human animals, some argue that the
combined weight of studies imply that at least chimpanzees and
some corvines take into account the goals and perceptual
perspectives of others – although maybe not their beliefs [36].
Those who reject this often argue that the studies are methodo-
logically flawed and unable even in principle to infer mental state
attribution: the results could be interpreted as reflecting no more
than behaviour reading [35,37].
Innovation
Innovations in animals have been observed in a wide range of
species [38–40]. Such innovation has received most attention from
ecological approaches and from the perspective of its role in
cultural transmission. However, it remains under-studied from
a cognitive perspective, so that the underlying proximate
mechanisms are neither well identified nor understood. The
difficulty pinpointing the cognitive mechanisms underlying in-
novation is partly related to the difficulty of defining it. Innovation
can be viewed either as the product (i.e., a novel behaviour pattern
[39]) of or the process that results in novel behaviour [41]. Given
these two perspectives, Reader and Laland [42] argue that
innovations (the product) are learned behaviour patterns. It follows
that innovation (the process) requires learning. This excludes from
the definition mere chance behaviour or innate behavioural
expressions. Reader and Laland recognize that general learning
alone cannot explain innovation. They suggest a number of broad
cognitive mechanisms – or behavioural processes – underlying
innovation (facilitating the necessary learning): e.g., exploration,
insight, creativity, and behavioural flexibility. Unfortunately, these
labels are all more or less poorly understood. The cognition behind
innovation remains largely uncharted.
What is interesting given the scope of the current study is the
way that innovation and deception have been linked in the context
of primates’ social life [3,39]. The two skills do seem closely
related: innovation can be said to occur when an existing signal or
other behaviour is used in a novel way [39]; tactical deception
occurs when a familiar and normally honest signal is used in a new
and misleading way [33].
Previous report on the chimpanzee of this study
In 2009 one of us (MO) reported on the projectile related
behaviour of the male chimpanzee, who is also the subject in this
study [23]. In 1997 the chimpanzee started to gather stones from
the water moat surrounding the outside compound and storing
them hours before he threw them in dominance displays at the
arriving zoo visitors. The behaviour was detected after some days
of unusually high number of projectiles being thrown. When
cleaning the island compound, the zookeepers found five stone
caches placed at the shoreline facing the visitors’ area. Following
days a zookeeper placed herself in a blind to observe the
chimpanzee behaviour during the morning hours. He was found
to retrieve stones from the moat and place them in piles. In 1998,
the chimpanzee started to manufacture projectiles by breaking off
loose pieces from the compound’s concrete surface, and then
placing them in the caches. The behaviour was observed a high
number of times during the decade covered by the report. The key
findings were not only that the ape prepared for future throwing
when the visitors was outside his field of perception, but also that
there appeared to be a dissociation between his emotional states:
calm during the gathering process, agitated during the throwing
sessions. These behaviours indicate foresight based on the episodic
system.
Nonetheless, concerns have been raised over how the findings
should be interpreted – because no detailed data is available on the
chimpanzee’s behaviour and circumstances at the moment when
the first caches were made [43,44]. Such information would have
been valuable for the understanding of the underlying factors
behind the behaviour. That said, explanations based solely on
associative learning mechanisms are difficult to motivate. Even if
the behaviour did start out by chance, or if initially, the
chimpanzee took the stones from the water and cached them
along the shore for some purpose other than throwing them later –
i.e., even if he only came later to realise that they could be thrown
– one still needs an explanation for the complexity of the resulting
behaviour, including the time spans and the manufacturing of
projectiles. One also needs to take into account the experimental
Figure 2. The first hay concealment made by the chimpanzee.
Note the projectile in the lower part under the heap. The visible
projectile above the heap was not present during the first throws. The
picture was taken at the end of the day.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036782.g002
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that associative learning alone cannot explain such behaviour. It
has been experimentally controlled for that chimpanzees do not
merely rely on conditioning in tasks of future tool use [22,45].
And, on the other side of the coin, it has been suggested that
chimpanzees are unable to learn to bring an item intended for
future exchange for food from a human, despite extensive prior
reinforcement training on the item [46]. These different findings
suggest that associative learning cannot on its own explain
foresighted behaviour in chimpanzees.
To gain more detailed information we systematically studied
how the projectile related behaviour starts at the beginning of a zoo
visitors’ season. This does not address the problem with lack of
data from the behaviour’s initial inception; however, it comple-
ments the earlier work and offers potential for more fine-grained
insights. During the 2010 season, previously unobserved beha-
viours were documented, comprising both deception and in-
novation in relation to the chimpanzee’s projectile planning
activities.
Methods
Ethics statement
The work was carried out under the Uppsala regional ethics
committee approval No C199/9. The Swedish Agricultural board
(No. 31-2599/09) has approved Furuvik Zoo as a cognitive
research facility on chimpanzees.
Subject
The male chimpanzee, Santino, was born in 1978 at Munich
Zoo in West Germany. At the age of five, he was transferred to
Furuvik Zoo, Sweden, where he has lived ever since. Over the
years, the composition of Santino’s group varied, ranging between
four and seven individuals of mixed sexes and ages. When Santino
became the dominant male at the age of 16, there was only one
other male in the group. This male died within the first year of
Santino’s dominance, leaving Santino as the sole male, as he has
remained until the date of this study. When this study was
conducted, apart from the male, the group consisted of five
females, two adults, two sub-adults and one infant.
Methodological premises
Furuvik Zoo is only open to the general public for a short
season: typically June to August. The general season is in some
years preceded by a shorter pre-season – usually in May – during
which the only visitors are guided educational groups. This study
was carried out in 2010 and the pre-season and general season
followed this pattern. The division of pre- and general season
governed the methods used.
Conducting a study where human bystanders are involved
presents challenges: in particular, the ethics of studying a poten-
tially dangerous behaviour. Ethically, the observer, aware of
Santino’s projectile-throwing behaviour, could not fail to intervene
upon observing preparations for impending throws.
During the pre-season, a zoo ethologist guided the groups, and
each visitor was informed about the chimpanzee’s throwing
behaviour. Given this, it was ethically appropriate to observe the
chimpanzee’s preparation of the projectiles without interference.
The pre-season afforded a well-controlled setting compared to the
general season, when a large number of visitors is moving around.
Among other things, it was possible to make accurate observations
on whether visitors were out of the chimpanzee’s view. Two
principal, complementary methods were used: (i) direct beha-
vioural observations and (ii) recovery of projectiles from the
compound at the end of a day. During the general season, only the
latter method could be used.
Behavioural observations
The primary goal was to address how the chimpanzee initiates
his projectile-throwing behaviour at the start of the visitors’ season.
Therefore, behaviour sampling with continuous recording was
used from the moment visitors were present during the pre-season.
An observation session began the moment a visitors’ group entered
the vicinity of the chimpanzee compound. The session ended
30 minutes after the visitors left. Two central observational codes
requires some elaboration:
Throws and throw attempts were recorded according to the
position from which they were executed. It was not always possible
to reliably observe the number of projectiles per throw, given the
speed of the throws and the frequency with which multiple
projectiles were thrown at once. Likewise it was not possible to
reliably retrieve thrown projectiles, due to the dense vegetation
around the compound.
A hiding was recorded if the observer clearly saw at least one
projectile being placed behind or underneath something that
would block the view. No hidings were recorded where the
chimpanzee was simply active in areas that were later found to
contain projectiles. This was a conservative coding, given the
difficulty of seeing projectiles in the chimpanzees’ closed hand.
(Obviously, this code was not incorporated immediately, but only
after the first observation of a hiding).
The observer needed to be out of the chimpanzee’s view, during
the periods when he did not have visitors. In consequence, the
observer did not have an unobstructed view of the entire island:
that would only have been possible with three simultaneous
observers, who would have been visible to the chimpanzee.
However, none of these restrictions proved problematic for
recording of the essential initial behaviours.
Recovery of projectiles
At the end of each day, remaining projectiles and concealments
were documented and removed. This was the only method
deployed once the general season began, and the monitoring
continued for 114 days. However, Santino only engaged in
projectile-related behaviour on two days of the general season.
Figure 3. A visitor’s view of the chimpanzee island. The X in the
left of the picture marks the position of the first hay heap. The arrow on
the left points at the protruding rock structure that was used as
concealment. The other two arrows point at the two logs that also
served as concealing obstacles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036782.g003
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originated at the place of concealment, that possibility did arise for
those projectiles placed behind one of two logs, where in each case
potentially loose concrete was present. The position of the
projectiles might in this case then be a result of chance, rather
than from intentional concealment. Therefore two types of
controls were used. First, two observers independently scanned
all concrete areas of the island, both visually and by probing the
concrete with the side of the fist (similar to Santino’s own
behaviour). Second, the two observers independently examined
the colour and structure of the projectiles, to judge whether they
matched the pattern of the adjacent concrete.
Results
Initial behaviours
The primary aim of this study was to document how the
projectile behaviour was initiated in a zoo season, and it turned
out that the first observations yielded findings indicating in-
tentional deception and innovation. Therefore the initial beha-
viours were essential and are described in detail.
The first attempt to throw projectiles in 2010 involved the first
visitors of the pre-season. The attempt was preceded by typical
male chimpanzee dominance display behaviour: aggressive bi-
pedal locomotion, pilo-erection and vocalization. The projectiles
were chipped off the surface layer of the concrete in the outdoor
compound island immediately before they were used. The guiding
zoo ethologist backed the group away before the ape could release
the projectile. He consequently desisted from throwing. This
pattern repeated three times in a row. When the group returned,
190 minutes later, the male made no aggressive displays. Instead
he walked from the centre of the compound island toward the
group, with two concrete projectiles in his hand. To the guide, his
appearance did not suggest intentions of throwing. The chimpan-
zee even stopped and picked up an apple floating in the water
from which he took a bite as he continued approaching the
visitors. Just within range, he made a sudden throw at the group
(see Figure 1). This behaviour fits with a category of deception
referred to as creating a neutral image. In this case, inhibiting an
aggressive intent in order to secure a close approach [3].
Following day, the chimpanzee made two further attempts,
preceded by aggressive display. In both cases, the group backed
away, and he desisted. When the group left, the chimpanzee were
observed being active in the area of one of the logs, thereafter he
brought a melon-sized heap of hay from the inside enclosure (see
Figure 2). This was placed on the island, close (8 metres) to the
visitors’ area. Subsequently he put an unknown number of
projectiles under the hay that were carried in his hand. When the
group returned to the compound 60 minutes later, the chimpan-
zee sat beside the hay. As the group approached, without
preceding display, he threw a projectile stored under the heap.
Shortly after, the chimpanzee positioned himself behind the log
close to another part of the visitors’ area (7 metres). When the
group moved into this area, he threw two stored projectiles from
behind the log. No display preceded the throws. When the group
left the compound again the chimpanzee was observed to cache
two more projectiles under the hay pile. These were thrown, with
no preceding display, 20 minutes later when the group returned to
the compound. In the evening the observers recovered twelve
remaining projectiles from the island, all from concrete. Out of
these, seven were found in hides: one under the hay pile facing the
moat, five behind the log and one under the hay outside the door
to the indoor enclosure.
A hay pile on the island, or any concealing behaviour, had not
been observed previously, either by the authors of the current
study or by the zookeepers. Due to the close monitoring and
documentation of the chimpanzee’s projectile caches since its
beginning, it is close to certain that the hay hide was a first case of
innovation for deception. The chimpanzee did however sometimes
use hay as resting material directly outside the door to the
enclosure, in a sheltered area approximately 22 meters, and out of
view, from centre of the actual island. On the time of the first hay
concealment the chimpanzee had taken out no such resting
material, only afterwards. Although later that day this resting
material also served as concealment.
The whole zoo season
Through the course of the zoo season four hidings were directly
observed as they took place (i.e. the actual projectiles were seen),
always with an observer outside of the chimpanzees view. In two
cases the hay was transported from the inside enclosure and placed
over the projectiles, and at two occasions the projectiles were
placed under the hay. In these instances the chimpanzee had first
encountered a group, and cached immediately after they left. In
one of these occasions he did not throw the concealed projectiles,
as the group did not return. In turned out to be problematic to
directly observe any unambiguous hidings behind the logs and the
rock structure. Projectile oriented behaviour occurred in seven
days in a period of 27 days. In all, 46 projectiles were recovered, of
which 35 came from concealments. Three types of concealments
were used: hay, logs (two different) and a protruding rock structure
(see Figure 3 for the perspective from the visitors side on the
different concealments).
Hay concealments were never placed behind the logs or the
rock structure. The concealments from naturally occurring
obstacles were visible to the chimpanzee but not to the visitors.
Out of the 35 concealed recovered projectiles, 15 were placed
under hay heaps (under 6 heaps; 2 ‘‘empty’’ heaps were also
recovered), 18 were placed behind logs and 2 were placed behind
a protruding rock structure (see Figure 4 for the distribution of
projectiles on different dates). The non-visible projectiles were
significantly more than expected by chance (binomial test,
P,0,001) (see Figure 5). Chance level was set at 50% which is
much conservative for three reasons: (1) the number of places with
naturally occurring obstacles on the island is far less than 50% of
the island’s area; (2) the number of potential behaviours the ape
Figure 4. The distribution of recovered projectiles during the
season. The numbers in the blocks represent the number of projectiles
in each category.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036782.g004
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than one; (3) a majority of the observed throws were made from
hides, i.e. the remaining projectiles recovered from hides were
fewer than the number that was actually hidden as compared to
the visible caches.
The controls of the areas with loose concrete, which did not
yield concealments or visible caches, revealed eight such areas in
both of the independently performed controls. The distribution of
the 18 projectiles behind two (the logs) out of ten possible areas
with loose concrete significantly deviates from chance distribution
(binomial test, P,0,001). The controls of colour and structure
showed that at least four projectiles almost certainly did not
originate from the vicinity of the concealments (only applicable for
the logs; the other concealment areas did not have loose concrete).
This is a highly conservative measure as the concrete is quite
similar throughout the compound, and it should be understood as
only a complementary control and not as the true numbers of
transported projectiles.
They way the chimpanzee coupled display behaviour with
throws and throwing attempts further hints at the intent with
hiding the projectiles. Out of the observed throws and throwing
attempts 8 were done with projectiles from hides and 8 with visible
projectiles. The chimpanzee did not display a single time before
throwing from a concealment, while he displayed 7 out of 8 times
when the projectiles were visible; the difference between the
conditions is significant (Fisher’s exact test, P=0,00139). The only
time the chimpanzee did not display in the visible condition was in
the event described in the above section. These figures should be
treated with some caution, as they also include throwing attempts in
the visible condition.
Discussion
The likely explanation for the concealments is that they were
intended for deception. Several factors converge on such an
assumption: no hay concealments were ever placed behind
concealing obstacles; most projectiles behind or under the
concealments had been transported there; when concealed, the
projectiles could be seen only from the viewpoint of the
chimpanzee or not by anyone; observed throws from the
concealments were never preceded by any display (suggesting
the combining of two deceptive strategies); concealing behaviours
were never observed when anyone was in the chimpanzee’s view.
It is less clear what prompted these deceptive behaviours and
the use of hay as the concealing material. One could speculate
about the chimpanzee’s initial throwing experience of the season,
watching the people backing away. Perhaps this led him to take
deceptive action, so he could release the projectiles at closer range.
The first time the chimpanzee – atypically for him – was observed
slowly approaching the visitors, displaying no obvious aggressive
intent, before suddenly throwing projectiles at them fits well with
a documented deceptive category in primates. There is no way to
tell whether this was the first time he ever used this strategy. The
strategy might occasionally have been used in the past. What is
close to certain, however, is that there had never before been a hay
concealment on the chimpanzee island, nor had projectiles ever
previously been found behind naturally occurring obstacles, only
as completely visible and close to the shore line.
The day the first concealments were made began as the day
before, with the onlookers backing away. Those first concealments
included both manufactured and naturally occurring ones. The
chimpanzee was quite familiar with hay, giving him plenty of
opportunities to learn its effect of blocking the view of objects; he
was similarly familiar with logs. He also occasionally transported
hay to a resting place just outside the door to the indoor enclosure,
giving him experience of bringing hay from the inside. That said,
any answer why and how he came up with the new strategy on his
second day of visitors would be speculative. Interestingly, he did
not start out on that second day using the deceptive strategy; his
initial encounter with the visitors played out as before, and only on
the second encounter did the aggression inhibition and use of
concealment occur. One obvious gain from the new strategy is that
the chimpanzee could use more projectiles in short succession. By
combining his old strategy of gathering projectiles in advance with
his new strategy of concealment and behavioural inhibition, he
could extend his ability to throw stones at visitors from close range.
Although, there is no way to tell whether this really was his
motivation.
Both the manufacture and use of the concealments were likely
premeditated. The behaviour never occurred when anyone was
within the chimpanzee’s view, but only after a group had been
present and left: i.e., prior to their possible return. That is, it
appears to have been prompted by the prior presence of visitors on
those days when it occurred: the chimpanzee prepared no
concealments on days when he had not previously seen visitors.
This departs from the chimpanzee’s previously reported behav-
iour, by which he typically collected projectiles in the morning
before the zoo opened, on days when the zoo had visitors. That
said, the earlier observations were based mainly on the general
season, not on the (rare) pre-season. During the general season,
visitors come every day, while during the pre-season, they arrive
sporadically, several days apart (see Figure 4 for the dates of the
pre-season in 2010). Taken together, the results suggest that the
chimpanzee crafted a desired outcome in a perceptually detached
future by acting innovatively in his current situation. Such activity
produces a specific future event, in contrast to activity that merely
prepares for a future situation as repetition of a previously
experienced event. That is why the most critical finding of this
study is the observation of the first instance of the concealment
behaviour. This is indication of the existence of that type of
perceptual simulation used by humans in certain planning tasks:
a recombining of components of previously experienced events.
The data further show that chimpanzees are able to plan for social
situations – at least for deception – and that social planning in
general is not out of reach for chimpanzees, as was suggested in
Figure 5. The number of visible and concealed projectiles.
Throughout the season the amount of recovered concealed projectiles
was significantly higher than that of the visible ones (binomial test,
P=0,00054).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0036782.g005
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Do the results imply that the chimpanzee possesses a theory of
mind? Sensu stricto, it appears as the results do not: however
elaborate, the concealments could be based on the chimpanzee’s
understanding of line of gaze. What the behaviour does appear to
show is that the chimpanzee is able to predict the behavioural
responses of others not present at the time of the prediction. Mind
reading is characterized as reasoning about what is not overt in
behaviour: i.e., mental states. What the chimpanzee appears to be
reading is likewise not overt in any behaviour (the visitors are not
present). That said, the performance is possible without represent-
ing anyone else’s mental states. What does seem to be a possibility
is detached perceptual constructs of others’ behaviours.
One means by which this might be achieved is again the
episodic system, allowing the agent to simulate others in the
context of a potential future situation. It has been suggested that in
humans, foresight, memory, and the taking of others’ viewpoints
all seem to be supported by a common brain network [47]. The
relevant brain structures appear to be largely shared with
chimpanzees [33]. In the context of theory of mind and planning,
it has been suggested that the meta-representational ability
required for representing others’ deviating psychological states is
a prerequisite for representing one’s own future deviating mental
states and hence planning for them. The alleged lack of such an
ability in non-human animals is one reason their planning is often
taken to be highly restricted [1]. However, such an assumption is
not necessary. When it comes to planning for your own deviating
mental states it has been suggested that the perceptual construct of
a potential situation plays a trick on the phylogenetically older
parts of the brain: the structures governing motivation treat the
construct more or less as true perceptions [48]. So, the potential
future mental state, or motivation, is brought to the present and
might act as a break on the motivations directed towards the
current situation. When planning for potential future behaviours
of others, we suggest that this could in principle also be solved by
detached perceptual construct of behaviours priorly experienced
under different circumstances. Then there is no need for theory-
like reasoning about other’s mental states, the behaviour could be
‘‘read’’ from the perceptual simulations (it is not necessary to
represent other’s mental states even for creating the constructs;
a learned behavioural catalogue would suffice). What underlies the
perceptual simulations of potential futures, what makes them to
form, is a highly interesting question beyond the scope of
speculations of this study.
The present report should be followed up by experimental
investigations whether chimpanzees – and other great apes – are in
general capable of planning for future deception; and whether they
have the ability to form representations of future behaviours of
others who are not present, given different situations. Such
experiments would provide an interesting avenue for advancing
the study of social cognition.
As an endnote: when observations were continued in the 2011
season, the chimpanzee did not cache or throw a single projectile.
He had suffered a hip injury at the beginning of the season and
was both generally slowed down and reluctant to leave his indoor
enclosure. By the middle of the season, at which point he had
healed, he showed no inclination to throw stones. This is consistent
with the pattern in the present and previous study, in which his
projectile-related behaviour was found to stop sometime before the
middle of the season.
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